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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






TAYLOR JOSE BRANCO-ANTONIO, 




 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                              Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A075-795-143) 
Immigration Judge: Kuyomars Q. Golparvar 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 12, 2019 
 
Before:   JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges  
 






JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Taylor Branco-Antonio seeks review of a decision rendered by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The government argues in response that we lack 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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jurisdiction over the petition for review.  We hold that we have jurisdiction, but we will 
deny the petition. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Branco-Antonio is a native and citizen of Angola who arrived in the United States 
as a nine-year-old in 1997, when his family fled violence in Angola.  He and his family 
were granted asylum.  Effective January 31, 2005, Branco-Antonio adjusted his status to 
lawful permanent resident.   
Branco-Antonio’s immigration status was put in jeopardy when he was convicted 
of retail theft on four separate occasions: three times in 2011-2012 and once in 2017.  In 
2012 and 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated, and subsequently 
suspended, removal proceedings against him under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) based on 
the determination that he is an alien convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude 
not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct.  In September 2017, the 
Department of Homeland Security submitted a motion to re-calendar his removal 
proceedings.  Branco-Antonio then filed an application for re-adjustment of status with a 
waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h), citing hardship to his U.S. citizen 
family members.   
After a hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the waiver and ordered 
Branco-Antonio removed.  The IJ did not find that Branco-Antonio’s family members 
would suffer extreme hardship if he were removed.  Further, the IJ exercised his 
discretion and determined that the adverse factors of Branco-Antonio’s undesirability as a 
permanent resident outweighed the social and humane considerations of allowing him to 
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remain in the United States.  Branco-Antonio appealed, and on July 10, 2018, the BIA 
dismissed the appeal, considering the same discretionary factors as had the IJ.     
Branco-Antonio then invoked 8 U.S.C. § 1229a in a motion to reopen and to stay 
removal.  The claimed basis of his motion was that he was newly eligible for cancellation 
of removal as a lawful permanent resident, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, and that new material 
evidence had been discovered concerning his mother’s health problems.  Despite that 
pending motion, Branco-Antonio was removed to Angola on August 18, 2018.  A month 
later, the BIA denied his motion to reopen.  In its analysis, the BIA exercised its 
discretion to weigh the adverse factors of Branco-Antonio’s undesirability as a permanent 
resident with the social and humane considerations of allowing him to stay in the United 
States, just as it had done in his July appeal for a waiver of inadmissibility.  Branco-
Antonio promptly filed this petition for review. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 The government claims that we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s 
decision because it was a discretionary determination.  Branco-Antonio disagrees and 
argues that we have jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and errors of law.  
Specifically, he claims the BIA committed three legal errors in denying his motion to 
reopen: first, the BIA did not consider the appropriate legal standard in its discretionary 
determination; second, the BIA erred in deciding that the new evidence he provided in his 
motion was not material; and third, the BIA denied him due process when it denied his 
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motion to reopen.  We agree with Branco-Antonio that we have jurisdiction, but we 
disagree with his assertions that the BIA erred.   
A. Jurisdiction  
We begin with jurisdiction.  The government contends that we do not have 
jurisdiction over this petition because the BIA made a discretionary determination and 
because Branco-Antonio has not raised any colorable constitutional issues or questions of 
law.  At least as to the latter point, not so. 
Even when the BIA has exercised its discretion, we retain jurisdiction over 
“constitutional claims or questions of law.”1  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  One of Branco-
Antonio’s claims is that the BIA did not apply the proper legal standard when exercising 
its discretion.  Whether the legal standard it chose was correct is a question of law within 
our jurisdiction.  See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here 
                                                 
1 The government’s primary argument that we lack jurisdiction here is that the 
BIA acted in its discretion, so its decision is not reviewable.  Essentially, the government 
treats the BIA’s decision not as a denial of a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, 
but as a discretionary determination on cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, 
which this Court does not have jurisdiction to review.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  
Because the BIA “leap[t] ahead” and opined on the merits of the cancellation of removal 
claim, the government says this is not really an order denying a motion to reopen but is 
rather an order denying cancellation of removal.  See I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 
(1988) (“…[T]he BIA may leap ahead, as it were, over the two threshold concerns (prima 
facie case and new evidence/reasonable explanation), and simply determine that even if 
they were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief.”).  
But while the BIA is free to examine the underlying relief sought, we still review the 
BIA’s disposition based on what it ultimately did, which was to deny a motion to reopen.  
See id. (In considering a motion to reopen, “in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief 
is discretionary…the BIA may leap ahead…and simply determine that even if [the 
threshold concerns] were met, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant 




the BIA is alleged to have made a hardship determination based on ‘an erroneous legal 
standard’… our jurisdiction to review that determination is secure.” (quoting Mendez v. 
Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 322 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam))).   
His next argument is that the BIA incorrectly determined that the evidence he 
proffered was not material.  The Supreme Court has instructed that we should review that 
kind of claim for an abuse of discretion, which certainly seems to assume that we have 
jurisdiction.  See I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 106-07 (1988) (“That is, in a given case the 
BIA may determine, either as a sufficient ground for denying relief or as a necessary step 
toward granting relief, whether the alien has produced previously unavailable, material 
evidence …. We hold today that such decisions are subject to an abuse-of-discretion 
standard of review.”).   
Finally, Branco-Antonio claims he was denied due process when he was not 
granted a hearing to determine whether he was eligible for cancellation of removal, a 
constitutional claim over which we have jurisdiction by statute.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (“[No provision] which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be 
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a 
petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this 
section.”).  Thus, we have jurisdiction to hear this petition. 
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B. Applicable Legal Standards  
Branco-Antonio challenges the discretionary standard the BIA used in denying his 
motion to reopen.2  He argues that the BIA erred when it relied on its previous 
discretionary findings to deny his waiver of inadmissibility.  Because of the different 
purposes of a waiver of inadmissibility and cancellation of removal, Branco-Antonio 
argues that the BIA improperly used the same analysis in exercising its discretion.  As we 
are considering the BIA’s determination when it leapt ahead to the underlying relief 
sought (i.e., cancellation of removal), we review for an abuse of discretion.  See Abudu, 
485 U.S. at 105 (“We have consistently held that denials on [leaping-ahead grounds] are 
subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it decided that Branco-Antonio did not 
qualify for discretionary relief.  It is true that a waiver of inadmissibility and cancellation 
of removal are different kinds of relief and involve different considerations.3  And the 
BIA has instructed that “it is prudent to avoid cross application, as between different 
                                                 
2 Branco-Antonio also challenges the legality of the BIA’s ability to leap ahead, 
claiming that it violates the INA.  However, we are bound by Supreme Court precedent 
that acknowledges the BIA’s ability to leap ahead to the underlying discretionary relief 
sought.  See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105 (“…[T]he BIA may leap ahead … and simply 
determine that even if they were met, the movant would not be entitled to the 
discretionary grant of relief.”).  Accordingly, the BIA’s leap-ahead determination was not 
prohibited by the statute. 
 
3 A waiver of inadmissibility is granted where the noncitizen’s removal “would 
result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, 
son, or daughter[.]”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B).  In contrast, cancellation of removal 
focuses on whether certain lawful permanent residents have met a set of requirements 
involving the amount of time they have resided in the United States.  See 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (listing residency requirements).   
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types of relief, of particular principles or standards for the exercise of discretion.”  In re 
Mendez-Morales, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 300 (BIA 1996).  Yet, despite the difference in 
purpose, the BIA has held that the discretionary factors to be considered substantially 
overlap for those two types of relief.  Compare id. (listing factors for exercising 
discretion in a waiver of inadmissibility determination) with In re C-V-T, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 7, 12 (BIA 1998) (listing same for exercising discretion in a cancellation of removal 
determination.).  Here, although the BIA referred to the determinations made by the 
Immigration Judge and BIA panel that decided Branco-Antonio’s waiver of 
inadmissibility appeal, it considered whether those same factors would apply in the 
cancellation of removal context and determined that they would.  Because the BIA 
undertook an appropriate analysis for cancellation of removal, in a reasoned opinion that 
was consistent with BIA precedent, it did not abuse its discretion. 
C. Materiality of Evidence 
Branco-Antonio also claims that the BIA erred when it determined that the new 
evidence he submitted was not material.  He says that the question of materiality is a 
legal question over which we exercise de novo review.  That is mistaken.  We review the 
BIA’s determination of whether a noncitizen presented “previously unavailable, material 
evidence” that justifies reopening for abuse of discretion.  Abudu, 485 U.S. at 105; see 
also Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We review the BIA’s denial 
of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.”).   
The new evidence Branco-Antonio presented was medical records relating to his 
mother’s health.  The BIA addressed that new evidence in the context of Branco-
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Antonio’s other familial relationships and determined that it was not material.  There was 
no abuse of discretion in doing so. 
D. Due Process 
Finally, Branco-Antonio claims that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to 
be heard because the BIA decided the merits of his cancellation of removal claim 
simultaneously with his motion to reopen and without a hearing.  But he was permitted to 
submit briefs and evidence to the BIA, including new evidence he would provide at a 
cancellation of removal hearing, and he did so.  Although he did not have a hearing on 
his cancellation of removal claim, he was sufficiently heard on the papers.  His due 
process rights were thus given adequate respect.  See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
348-49 (1976) (“The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor 
even the most effective, method of decision-making in all circumstances. … All that is 
necessary is that … [those who are to be heard] are given a meaningful opportunity to 
present their case.”). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.   
